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Abstract
We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and
facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and
in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing,
communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for
sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in
setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partition-
ing of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate
fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management
problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of
which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applica-
tions are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem
whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infras-
tructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested
in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong
framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of
players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic ”Collocation Game”. Although we
show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard,
we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which
we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price
of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation
of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of
multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using
trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and
also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative
for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach
(centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.
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1 Introduction
Motivation and Scope: Cloud computing has emerged as a compelling paradigm for the deployment
of distributed applications and services on the Internet [16, 12, 24].
The advent of cloud computing can be attributed in large to the maturity and wide adoption
of virtualization technologies. By relying on virtualized resources, users are able to easily deploy,
scale up or down, and migrate their applications seamlessly across computing resources offered by
one or more infrastructure providers. More importantly, virtualization enables performance isolation,
whereby each application is able to acquire appropriate fractions of shared fixed-capacity resources
for unencumbered use, ensuring that the application would meet minimal Quality of Service (QoS)
or Service-Level Agreement (SLA) requirements. Enabling the specification and dynamic acquisition
of the fraction of a resource that is needed for proper application support is important because it
allows multiple applications to be safely collocated on a shared cloud resource.
The assignment of applications (each with its own resource requirements) to resource instances
is a classical resource management problem – that of partitioning the entire set of applications into
subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity resources. If the computing infrastructure as well
as the various applications making use of that infrastructure are all under the same administrative
domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the
overall deployment cost. This is not the case in a cloud computing environment.
Cloud computing decouples the ownership/operation of computing resources from the usage of
such resources, in much the same way the ownership and operation of a power plant is decoupled from
the usage of the electricity it produces. Cloud computing users leverage resources (servers, networks,
and storage) hosted by a provider and are billed for what they use based on a preset resource-quantum
per unit-time price, like a metered utility. For example, using the Amazon cloud, an EC2 instance (a
64-bit windows processing platform with 7.5GB of RAM and 850GB of storage) costs $0.5 per hour
[3]. Thus, to run a server on such an instance for a month would cost $360. Notice that this cost is
bourn by the user whether or not the user consumes the full capacity of the instance. In other words,
the pricing of the resource is independent of the utilization of that resource. Clearly, it is possible
for multiple users to share the use of a cloud resource as long as their aggregate utilization does not
exceed the capacity of the resource. While such collocation would be attractive to users (as it would
lower their costs) it is not attractive to the provider (as it would reduce their profits). This suggests
that providers have no incentive to “optimize” the assignment of users to resources – indeed, they
have the exact opposite incentive. This implies that it is up to each user in the cloud to minimize
its own cost through collocation with other users – noting that a resulting assignment of users to
resources that is best for one user may not be the best for other users.
To summarize, in a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing
its own profit, and in which each (independent and rational) user is interested in minimizing its
own cost, viewing cloud resource management as a global optimization is precisely the wrong way
to approach the problem. Rather, given a user’s ability (afforded by virtualization) to unilaterally
migrate from one resource to the other in order to reduce its own cost as a result of better collocation
with other users, cloud resource allocation and acquisition is better viewed through a game theoretic
perspective. To that end, in this paper we introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general
framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders
in a cloud computing environment.
Related work: Economic models have been used in prior Grid resource management frameworks
(e.g., [8, 26, 17, 6]) in which commodity markets, auctions, double-auctions, and combinatorial auc-
tions are used for resource allocation and scheduling. VCG mechanisms have the advantage of opti-
mizing the social value and of being strategy-proof, at the expense of being computationally hard. A
common element across all of these frameworks is the assumption that there is an authority control-
ling the market and that all users trust it, and abide by its decisions. An alternative perspective to
avoid the need for this central authority is to frame the problem as a game in which player actions
are guided by their own selfish and rational goals, but in such a way that the incentives lead to an
equilibrium not too far from a socially-desirable outcome.
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Algorithmic game-theory has provided us with many examples ([20, 13, 25, 7]) where indeed
it is possible to obtain self-organized systems that achieve an equilibrium within a bound (Price-
of-Anarchy) of the social optimum. For example, in scheduling games (e.g., [20, 13]) users share
a set of parallel links (processors) to transfer a file (execute a task) and the goal of each user is
to minimize its individual completion time (or makespan), whereas in routing games (e.g., [25, 7])
users share a network with a given topology and link capacities, and the goal of each user is to
find the minimum-cost path for its flow. In both of these examples, the cost function is assumed
to increase with the number of users sharing the resource, and the resources themselves have no
capacity constraints (and thus are unable to provide any performance guarantees). Motivated by
considerations of emerging cloud, grid, and SoA practices, our setting is different as we assume that
users have minimum allocation requirements that need to be reserved exclusively (for QoS or SLA
purposes), and thus the capacity of the resource is a constraint that limits feasible assignments.
Cost-sharing games [21, 5, 10] deal specifically with settings in which resource costs are fixed
and distributed among users sharing them. In particular, cooperative cost sharing games [21] define
two models: The Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) model or the Transferable Utility Model (TU).
The concept of equilibrium is captured by the notion of the core of the game, i.e., a coalition where
no player would benefit by breaking away. For TU-games, where the cost of the resources may be
arbitrarily assigned, approximate solutions can be found using linear programming. Finding the core
for NTU games is exponential in the worst-case. In contrast, our collocation games are pure-strategy
games, where the cost is distributed in proportion to the allocated shares. So, although the cost is
variable, it is determined by the allocation. This is an important differentiator, which is motivated
by a real-world notion of fairness in apportioning cost based on resource allocation. On the other
hand, Anshelevich et al[5] present a pure-strategies cost sharing scheme applied to network formation
games and generalized to allocation of subsets of resources from an global pool or resources. In this
case, the cost is equally shared among all players using a single resource, which leads to a well
behaved potential function. This model does not generalize to games with more than two players
with weighted requirements. Chen and Roughgarden [10] later showed that for the general case where
of a network where users with different weights share the fixed cost of the network’s edges, the game
does not always have a pure Nash equilibrium. It is possible though to achieve an α-approximate
Nash equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which no player can reduce its own cost by more than a
multiplicative factor α. More specifically they showed there is a trade-off between the relaxation
factor α and the corresponding price of stability of the game.
Contributions: We present a game-theoretic model for the interaction of rational, selfish players
sharing resources in a distributed environment, where users can easily relocate their tasks subject
to QoS constraints. The general model describes the behavior of a wide range of self-organizing
distributed systems, where all interactions are guided by players’ selfish goals. Under this general
setting, we show that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is an NP-complete problem. Next, we
explore the mechanism design problem of creating a cost function that induces a particular (desirable)
user behavior. In particular we explore the goal of maximizing resource utilization so that all users
can perform their tasks subject to their QoS guarantees, but minimizing the total (social) cost of
the allocated resources. We present a simplified version of the collocation game, called the Process
Collocation Game, for which we provide analytical bounds on convergence and price of anarchy for
(unidimensional) games involving a single type of resources. We also show that our convergence
results extend to (multidimensional) games involving multiple types of resources as well. We also
present results for PPCG, a variant of PCG that allows users to request an aggregate set of resources
(e.g., a server farm, or servers arranged in a particular topology) as opposed to a single resource.
In addition to these analytical findings, we also present empirical results obtained from two sets of
experiments. In the first set, we used synthetically-generated workloads to explore the characteristics
of the game under a wide range of settings. In the second, we used PlanetLab traces to evaluate the
game dynamics under realistic multi-resource scenarios. In addition to corroborating our analytical
findings, our experimental results suggest that collocation games could be used as the basis for
building distributed, on-line, self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization
approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.
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2 Collocation Games: Definition and Applications
In this section we present the basic definitions underlying collocation games, relating these defini-
tions as much as possible to applications in distributed systems in general, and to our target cloud
computing applications in particular.
Model and Notation: We use a labelled graphG =< V,E > to model general infrastructure (cloud)
resources that are available to a set of users. We refer to this graph as the hosting (or infrastructure)
graph. Vertices (or nodes) in G represent standalone resources, whereas edges represent relationships
between these resources. Examples of standalone resources include processors and storage (such as
Amazon’s EC-2 or S3 instances), both of which would be represented as vertices in G. Examples
of relationships between standalone resources include communication links and spatio-temporal ad-
jacencies, both of which would be represented as edges in G. Here we note that edges in G may
be directed or undirected. For instance, a pipeline of processing units would be represented using a
chain of vertices, in which each pair of adjacent vertices are connected using a directed edge, whereas
a cluster of processing units on a LAN would be represented using a fully-connected subgraph, in
which each pair of vertices are connected using an undirected edge.
We use a labelled graph T to model the set of cloud resources and underlying relationships that
are necessary to support a specific user application or task. We refer to this graph as the user requested
task graph. Vertices and edges in T have the same meaning as those in the hosting graph G. Labels
in G or T may decorate either vertices or edges. In a hosting graph, labels specify supply attributes
such as unit capacities and unit prices of processing or communication links.1 In a requested task
graph, labels specify demand attributes such as the minimum CPU utilization and storage needed by
a standalone process, or the minimum bandwidth tolerable by communicating processes, etc. in the
task. Notice that resources may have multidimensional capacities. For example, an Amazon EC-2
instance specifies capacities along three dimensions corresponding to CPU, RAM, and disk. Thus, it
is convenient to refer to the supply of (or demand on) a resource with a capacity (utilization) vector.
As illustrated in Figure 1, a set of requested task graphs (one per user) constitutes the overall
workload to be hosted on the infrastructure graph G. A mapping M of the (vertices and edges in
the) set of request graphs to the (vertices and edges in the) hosting graph constitutes a configuration
underscoring a specific assignment of users to resources. A valid configuration is one wherein supply
meets demand – for example, the aggregate demand (e.g., CPU utilization) of all users sharing a
vertex in G do not exceed the supply (e.g., CPU capacity) of that vertex. Given a valid configuration,
the infrastructure provider expects to be paid for any resource in G used by at least one task (user),
but not for (idle) resources to which no tasks were mapped. The price charged per resource is fixed,
independent of the number of users sharing that resource. The cost incurred by a user is given by a
cost function which apportions the price of each resource in G among all users with tasks mapped to
that resource. The cost function can be seen as the marketplace mechanism that governs and induces
symbiotic relationships among rational, selfish agents (the users). Without loss of generality, in this
paper, we adopt a specific form of cost functions that may be conceived as fair – namely, those that
split the fixed cost of a resource among tasks in some proportional (e.g., linear) fashion based on the
utilization of that resource by the various tasks assigned to it.
The General Collocation Game (GCG): Given a hosting graph G =< V,E > where each vertex
and edge in G is labelled with a resource capacity vector (R) and a price (P ), and given a collection
of tasks, each in the form of a graph Ti =< Vi, Ei >, where each vertex and edge in Ti is labelled with
a weight underlying a resource utilization vector (W ), the General Collocation Game is the pure-
strategies game, in which each task is able to make a (better response) move whereby, if possible, the
task modifies a valid mapping M into another M ′ so as to minimize its own cost, given by a function
1 Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to capacity and pricing, noting that other attributes may well
be considered, e.g., the maximum delay on a link or the OS version and supported APIs on a processing unit. Such
attributes would be used to determine the feasibility of mapping vertices and edges from T to G.
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Figure 1: The Collocation Game
cM (Ti) for the cost of task Ti when hosted in G according to a mapping M :2
cM (Ti) =
∑
j∈{Vi,Ei}
Pj ·
(
wij + (1− Uj)
wij
Uj
)
=
∑
j∈{Vi,Ei}
Pj
wij
Uj
(1)
where wij is the weight (or utilization) imposed on resource j by task Ti, Pj is the price of the
resource, and Uj is the total utilization of the resource (by all tasks assigned to the resource by M).
This is the same Shapley cost used in [10], which meets desirable fairness properties. In addition it is
also budget balance, i.e. the total cost to the players is always equal to the total cost of the resources.
The social cost of GCG for a given mapping M is the sum of the costs of all tasks:
s =
∑
∀Ti
cM (Ti) (2)
The Process Collocation Game (PCG): PCG is a restricted (simpler) version of GCG for which
we have concrete analytical results (presented in §3). In a PCG, a task graph consists of a single
vertex representing an independent process (say a computation) that needs to be assigned to a single
resource (say a processor). In a PCG, the cost function for process i when mapped to resource j is
cj(i) = Pj · wi/Uj (3)
where Uj is the overall utilization of resource j, which must satisfy its capacity constraint:
Uj =
∑
i∈j
wi ≤ Rj (4)
Assuming all processes (users) are rational and selfish, the only move that a process would make
in PCG is one that results in a reduction of its own cost and would also benefit other processes
with which the process would be collocated as a result of the move. When a process i moves from
resource a to resource b, two situations are possible. In the first situation, the move by process i does
not result in a displacement of any of the processes on resource b. We call such moves placement
moves. This situation occurs if resource b has enough capacity to host process i (in addition to all
the processes already on it before the move). In this case, it is easy to show that the utilization
of resource b increases and that the cost for all processes already on resource b is reduced. In the
second situation, the move by process i results in displacing one or more of the processes that were
2 Throughout the paper, we conveniently refer to processes and resources using their indices, e.g., i instead of Ti.
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on resource b before the move. We call moves that result in such displacement replacement moves.
For a replacement move to be possible the cost of all processes that are not replaced by the move
must be reduced (otherwise, as rational players, such processes would not accept to be collocated
with process i on resource b). This will be the case if the move results in a strict increase in the total
utilization of b.
Let U ′b refer to the utilization of resource b after a move by process i into it. Clearly, for both
placement and replacement moves, U ′b > Ub – i.e., U
′
b increases as a result of the move. The only
reason for a process i to “move” from resource a to resource b is that cb(i) < ca(i). This, along with
our observation that U ′b > Ub, yields the following conditions for what constitutes a valid move by
process i into resource b:
U ′b > Ub and
Pb
U ′b
< PaUa (5)
The Multidimensional Process Collocation Game: As we alluded before, a resource (vertex)
in the hosting graph may have a multidimensional capacity (recall the CPU, memory, and storage
attributes of an EC-2 instance) and is thus represented by a capacity vector Rj = [rj1, . . . , rjd] and
a fixed (scalar) price Pj . A natural representation of the demand from such a resource is a vector
Xi = [xi1, . . . , xid], whose components represent the task’s demand (or requested utilization) from
each dimension of the resource. A multidimensional PCG is a game in which resources (and process
utilizations) are multidimensional.
For the purpose of defining a cost function and valid moves for multidimensional PCG, we need
to make a few adjustments to our previous definitions. In particular, a set of tasks can be assigned
to resource j if the sum vector of demands is component-wise less than the capacity vector:
∑
i∈j
Xi ≤ Rj (6)
To apportion the multidimensional resource price among the processes collocated at the resource, we
define the multidimensional utilization of a single process by its volume: vi =
∏d
k=1 xik. The total
utilization of all processes collocated at resource j is the sum of the multidimensional utilization of
these processes: Uj =
∑
i∈j vi. This leads us to the following definition for the cost of task i when
allocated to resource j (noting that the sum of the cost for all tasks collocated at resource j matches
the price set for resource j):
cj(i) = Pj ·
vi
Uj
(7)
In a multidimensional PCG, a valid move is one that meets the feasibility constraint (6) and that
gives a cost reduction for the task, so when process i moves from a to b, cb(i) < ca(i) and
Pb
Ub+vi
< PaUa .
As before, this definition extends to replacement moves as well, by assuring that the task that moves
and the tasks that remain in the destination reduce their costs
U ′b > Ub and
Pb
U ′b
<
Pa
Ua
(8)
The Parallel Process Collocation Game (PPCG):We consider the following extension of PCG
which allows for tasks to consist of a set of parallel processes. In PPCG, the hosting graph G is a
complete graph of n vertices (or nodes), where the ith node has resource capacity Ri and price Pi.
In PPCG, a workload consists of a collection of task graphs T1, . . . , Tm, where task graph Ti consists
of a set of ki nodes, each of which with a specific utilization requirement (weight). Thus Ti is fully
specified by parameters (ki, wi1, . . . , wiki), where ki is a positive integer denoting the number of nodes
(e.g., processors) needed by Ti and 0 < wij ≤ 1 denotes the utilization demanded from node j.3
Notice that by definition, the ki nodes requested by Ti must be mapped to different nodes in the
hosting graph G. When wi1 = wi2 = ... = wiki , we call Ti a uniform parallel process and we refer to
the resulting game as a uniform PPCG (non-uniform PPCG, otherwise).
3 Clearly, our standard PCG is a special case of PPCG where ki = 1.
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As described above, in PPCG there are no topological constraints on the set of nodes requested
by a task (process) since graph Ti featured no edges. In general, however, a parallel process may
specify a particular topology, which must be satisfied in any valid mapping of the task graph onto
the hosting graph. Of particular interest are parallel process collocation games in which the parallel
processes have regular topologies (e.g., a ring, a mesh, a hypercube, etc.) Also, as described above,
in PPCG the hosting graph was a complete graph. In general, however, the hosting graph itself may
feature a regular topology onto which the parallel process structures would be mapped. Again, of
special interest are hosting graphs that exhibit regular topologies.
Applications of Collocation Games: We conclude this section with a set of distributed resource
management problems, illustrating how each such problem may be cast as a collocation game.
Content Distribution Networks: Caching content closer to its consumers is the cornerstone of CDN
applications [4, 23, 14, 15]. If CDN overlays were able to acquire physical resources on demand (as
enabled by services such as Amazon CloudFront [2]), they could potentially reduce their cost by
not having to pay for a fixed infrastructure, and by adapting quickly to bursts in demand. Each
CDN has therefore varying requirements for allocating storage/processing power and nodes, and
network capacity. Viewing each overlay as a player, multiple players may achieve economies of scale
by strategically coallocating their services. CDN collocation is an example of GCGs, in which the
hosting and task graphs may exhibit arbitrary topologies, dimensionality, etc.
Media Streaming Networks: Online media streaming uses various kinds of overlays to deliver content
over the network [19, 9, 27]. In this case, bandwidth, delay and jitter are important QoS parameters
for allocating network links, as well as CPU capacity for packet forwarding at intermediate nodes.
The resulting overlay may be a tree, multiple parallel trees or a mesh. In all such cases, the content
providers may collocate portions of their overlays to reduce their costs. Collocation of media stream-
ing networks is an example of PPCG, in which the hosting and task graphs may exhibit regular
topologies and QoS constraints.
Service Oriented Architectures - Service composition: In SOA/Grid architectures an application is
specified as the composition of services. A natural way to describe these systems is as a directed
graph where nodes are services and edges are the communication between services. Nodes and edges
can be labelled with their computational/communication demands. Existing work, e.g. [1, 18], is
based on the assumption that applications do no compete for the shared resources, which is precisely
what collocation games would enable.
Virtual Machine Collocation: Server virtualization at the datacenter enables better utilization of
resources. In some cases, the providers offer very coarse allocation/pricing schemes. Coarse grained
allocation policies lock customers into configurations that may cost them significantly more than
what they really need. Providers have no incentive to allow users to mix and match, not to mention
interact with other providers. On the other hand, if customers themselves are able to identify each
other in a distributed peer-to-peer fashion, allocate and partition the servers they need according
to their needs, a tighter packing is possible and both the total number of allocated servers and the
average cost would be reduced. VM collocation is an example of PCG.
Workflow Scheduling: A workflow represents a complex process composed of many subtasks. Work-
flows are commonly represented as directed-acyclic graphs, where nodes correspond to subtasks and
edges to dependency relationships. A very prominent problem within the high-performance comput-
ing literature is that of minimizing the makespan of a collection of tasks, which again is supported
on the assumption that all the tasks will cooperate by following the dictated optimal schedule. On
the other hand, if tasks are controlled by independent selfish agents, this assumption no longer holds,
and the collocation games offers a more appropriate model.
3 Analytical Results
Nash Equilibrium of GCG: The GCG does not necessarily have a Nash Equilibrium (NE), as
illustrated by the examples in Figure 2.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Examples of Collocation Games with no Nash Equilibria.
Let us consider example (a). Here the hosting graph is an m-vertex ring. Each vertex is of
unit capacity. Each of the n (2 ≤ n < m) tasks consists of two connected vertices, with utilization
requirements 1/2 < αi ≤ αmax < 1 and 0 < #i < 1− αmax, respectively.
Observe that two tasks, say T1, T2, cannot be assigned to the same hosting nodes ti, ti+1, as the
sum of two α nodes exceeds one. So, feasible configurations are consecutive or disjoint nodes. As
n < m, there will always be at least one edge (α→ #) connecting a pair of unmatched nodes, as some
segment of the hosting graph will not be used. Without loss of generality, let T1 be the task whose α
node is free, and task T2 be the task whose # node is free. The GCG cost function implies that the
best strategy for T2 is to move so that its # node shares the hosting node with the α node of T1. If
we consider the set of strategies of all tasks, no matter what strategy Ti chooses, there will always
be at least one free edge, and the task Tj whose # node is free will be better off relocating. Since this
holds for all possible strategies of all tasks, we conclude that there is no equilibrium.
Similarly, in example (b) the interests of both players conflict. In this example each player asks
for three different CPUs, with the additional requirement that the CPUs must be adjacent. In the
configuration shown the top player would benefit by swapping the position of tasks 0.5 and 0.1, as
its cost goes from 1.79 to 1.75. After this move, the best response for the other player is to swap
its 0.5 and 0.3 nodes as his cost reduces from 2.25 to 2.20. At this point, this configuration is the
symmetric of the original one, and the game keeps going forever.
Example (c) illustrates even another case, where the small task (node of weight 0.4) prefers to
join the node of value 0.6 of the large task, which gives a cost of 0.4 the minimum possible for the
player. However, the large player prefers to match its 0.3 node to the other player’s 0.4. This gives a
minimum cost of 1.43 for the large player. As both players can keep switching positions forever, the
game never reaches an equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Determining whether a GCG has a Nash Equilibrium is NP-Complete.
Proof. Consider some instance of the 3-SAT problem, with m clauses and n variables as given below:
φ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm
Ck = lk1 ∨ lk2 ∨ lk3
, where
lki ∈ {xj ,¬xj}
xj ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}
We show how to construct a GCG corresponding to the 3-SAT problem as follows (Figure 3
illustrates this construction).
Consider a set of m + 1 task graphs of the form # → α, such that α > 1/2 and # < (1 − α)/m.
There is also a second set of tasks of the form δ → 1 with δ = 1 −m#. For this collection of task
graphs, it is only feasible to share allocations for # nodes.
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Figure 3: Contruction used in proving that establishing NE for GCG is NP-Complete.
Consider a hosting graph with n pairs of nodes xj and ¬xj , with pairs of edges xj → ¬xj and
¬xj → xj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, corresponding to the variables of the 3-SAT problem. The graph also has
m nodes Ck, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, corresponding to the clauses of the 3-SAT problem, as well as an edge
per clause term lki connecting each of the variables xj and ¬xj in a clause to the corresponding Ck
node. By definition of 3-SAT there will be 3m of these edges. Finally, the hosting graph includes a
ring of m+n+2 nodes t1, t2, . . . , tm+n+2. Set the costs and capacities of all nodes and edges to one.
Claim: If the 3-SAT problem instance is satisfiable, then there is a Nash equilibrium for the corre-
sponding Colocation Game; otherwise there is no Nash equilibrium.
First, we consider the case when the 3-SAT problem is satisfiable. We assign the GCG tasks
as follows: There is at least one lki edge used in the true assignment per clause. Place an (# → α)
task from the variable node, to the corresponding clause node. Map the n (δ → 1) tasks to the n
pairs of (xj ↔ ¬xj) nodes by matching the # nodes to the δ nodes. Because 3-SAT is satisfiable, this
assigns all the δ → 1 tasks and m of the #→ α tasks. Place the last (#→ α) edge in the ring. This
configuration is a Nash Equilibrium as it is easy to check that there are no other assignments that
avoid placing edges in the ring (making it a non-stable configuration), and there is no task with an
alternative cost-reducing position.
Now consider the case when the 3-SAT problem is unsatisfiable. From our previous ring example,
no configuration with more than one (#→ α) tasks in the ring is stable. So, we place one in the ring
and try to place the others outside. We can place n on the edges (xj → ¬xj), but still would have
m to place elsewhere. Because 3-SAT is not satisfiable, there are less than m edges lki → Ck and we
are forced to place at least one more task in the ring, giving a configuration with no equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium of PCG: We define P = (. . . , pi = Pi/Ui, . . . , pm) as the vector of ratios
of prices to utilizations for all resources. In addition, we introduce a sorting function L(P ) =
(p(1), p(2), . . . , p(m)), whose image is the vector or sorted components of P , i.e., p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ . . . ≤
p(m). Consider the evolution of L(P ) as a result of making a valid move. In particular, define P
the vector before the move, and P ′ the vector after the move. The following lemma shows that the
succession of vectors L(P ) is lexicographically ordered.
Lemma 1. In a PCG, the ordered vector of unclaimed spaces after a valid move dominates the
previous vector: L(P ′) < L(P ), where domination implies that p′(i) ≤ p(i) for all i = 1 . . . k, with
strict inequality for k, p′(k) < p(k).
Proof. Assume task xj is moving from a to b and that the sorted vectors of price ratios are
L(P ) =
(
. . . ,
Pa
Ua
, . . .
)
and L(P ′) =
(
. . . ,
Pb
U ′b
, . . .
)
By (5) we know that Pb/U ′b < Pa/Ua, which implies that Pb/U
′
b will be either in the same position,
or if it becomes smaller than one of the predecessors of Pa/Ua, it will move to the left. In either case,
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Examples illustrating PCG PoA for (a) homogeneous and (b) heterogeneous settings.
the element Pb/U ′b is strictly less than the corresponding element of L(P ), and all other predecessors
remain unchanged, therefore L(P ′) dominates L(P ).
Theorem 2. PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium under better response dynamics.
Proof. Lemma 1 defines a partial order in the set of vectors of price ratios. This partial order has
one or more minimal elements and therefore the sequence of moves has to stop before, or at most
when it reaches one of these minima.
Since PCG may not converge to a minimal element, it might be useful to know the Price of
Anarchy (PoA), i.e. the ratio of the worst-case cost in an equilibrium to the cost in a socially-
optimal solution. Figure 4 illustrates two examples, the first one for homogeneous resources and the
second one for heterogeneous resources, where the equilibria are not optimal. In the example of part
a) all the resources have capacity one, the top configuration is a NE and the bottom configuration
is optimal (OPT). The large processes have utilizations (weights) 1/2 < l ≤ 2/3 − 2e/3, so they
cannot be collocated. The small processes have size s = 2e/3 and there are 1/e ≥ 8 of them. So
the utilization when they are all in the same bin is 2/3. Individually, none will move with the large
objects, as this does not reduce their cost, but when they all move with the large objects as in the
bottom configuration, the cost of all players reduces and the social cost is minimum.
Theorem 3. The price of anarchy for homogeneous PCG is 3/2 while the price of the anarchy for
heterogeneous PCG is 2.
Proof. Assuming resources of equal price and capacity (all normalized to 1), a lower bound for an
optimal collocation is the summation of all process utilizations, and an upper bound is placing one
process per resource. If there are n processes, we get:
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ OPT ≤ n (9)
The PCG construction in figure 4(a) exemplifies a tight optimal collocation.
First, we observe that if there were more resources with processes of utilization 1/2 < l ≤
2/3−2e/3, then the cost ratio between NE and OPT would be (|L|+1)/|L|, where |L| is the number
of “large” processes. This ratio is maximized when |L| = 2. Alternatively, consider the case where
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there are more resources with low-utilization processes. This situation would not be an equilibrium
as any process with utilization ti in bin A would benefit by moving to bin B whenever UB + ti ≥ UA.
Therefore, the equilibrium would occur when all low-utilization processes have filled as much as
possible some of the resources. In the worst case, it would have been possible to split such processes
into two bins, with one large process of size 1/2+ # in each. This implies that a worst-case cost ratio
of 3/2 between NE and OPT.
As for the case where resources have non-uniform capacities (with proces proportional to capac-
ity), the PoA can be bounded as illustrated by the example in Figure 4(b). The example shows a NE
with cost n, where the optimal configuration has cost n(1/2 + #), so this gives a lower bound Ω(2).
Now, by contradiction assume an arbitrary collection of tasks such that
∑
ti > n/2 and whose PoA
is greater than 2. By the definition of PoA and using (9) this would imply n/
∑
ti > 2, which is a
contradiction of the fact that the initial set of tasks has
∑
ti > n/2. Therefore 2 is a tight bound on
the PoA.
Convergence speed of PCG: It is possible to bound the number of moves that it takes for the
game to reach a NE in the case of homogeneous resources (They all have the same capacity and the
same price – without loss of generality we can set capacities and prices to be one). To so so, let’s
define the vector of unclaimed spaces
V = 1n − U = (v1, . . . , vn)
then consider the following potential function
φ(V ) = v(1) + . . .+ nv(n) (10)
where n is the number of resources, and v(i) are the components of L(V ). Let’s also introduce the
minimum allowed improvement ε as the threshold in the decrease of unclaimed space necessary to
make a move. If the change is below this threshold, the move will not be performed. Then, when
an object moves from j to i, the potential of resource i decreases by at least ε(n − i + 1) and the
potential of j increases at least by ε(n− j + 1). The minimum change in potential is
∆φ(V ) = ε(n− i+ 1)− ε(n− j + 1)
= ε(i− j)
which is minimal when moving between adjacent resources, in which case is ε.
At the beginning the potential is is at most
φ(1, . . . , 1) =
n∑
i=1
i =
n(n+ 1)
2
≈
n2
2
An upper bound on the number of moves m would then be the number of moves to go from the
maximum potential to just below the threshold
mε ≥
n2
2
− ε
m ≥
1
ε
(
n2
2
)
− 1
m = O
(
n2
)
(11)
We now turn our attention to multidimensional PCG. According to (8), valid moves are defined
by the ratios of price to utilization of the resources (a scalar quantity). Consequently, the exact
same construction used for the unidimensional case describes the dynamics of price ratios vector for
multidimensional PCG, yielding the following theorem.
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Figure 5: Worst and best cases for a player’s cost
Theorem 4. Multidimensional PCG converges to a Nash equilibrium under better response dynamics.
Lower bounding the worst-case cost paid by a player: As defined before, player i’s cost when
placed in resource R is
P ·
vi∑
j∈R vj
The worst-case for a player is when he is the only user of a resource (Figure 5a) and in this case
he has to pay P . The best case is when the player only has to pay for its portion of the volume, and
the volume taken by other players is maximum (Figure 5b). In this case the player has to pay
Pbest = P ·
vi
vi +
∏d
k=1(ck − xk)
hence the ratio of the worst-case cost to the best case is:
worst
best
=
vi +
∏d
k=1(ck − xk)
vi
= 1 +
∏d
k=1(ck − xk)∏d
k=1 xk
In the continuous case it is unbounded, but considering a discrete representation of b-bits along
each dimension, with a minimum permissible allocation of 1 unit, an a resource capacity along each
dimension of 2b − 1, then when having d dimensions, the worst case ratio can be bounded as
worst
best
= 1 +
∏d
k=1(2
b − 2)∏d
k=1 1
= 1 +O(2bd) (12)
A practical consideration resulting from this analysis is that given the heterogeneity of the
resources and of the task sizes, using a large number of bits to represent capacities and demands
would severely hurt the worst-case cost for a player. Instead, subdividing the resources into classes and
assigning tasks to the smallest class that can contain it, makes it is possible to use a reduced number of
bits per class. This subdivision also makes sense from the point of view of the cloud-resource provider:
He will typically acquire machines by homogeneous batches, but each batch belonging to different
hardware generations whose capacity typically corresponds to an exponential increments. Having
various classes of homogeneous resources also brings the additional benefit that the price-of-anarchy
is bounded (it is not for heterogeneous resources) and relatively small.
We conclude this section with equilibrium results for parallel PCG (PPCG).
Theorem 5. On the one hand, PPCG with uniform processes converges to a Nash equilibrium under
better response dynamics. On the other hand, better response dynamics for PPCG with non-uniform
processes may cycle.4
4 This theorem can be extended to the multidimensional version of PPCG.
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Proof. In uniform PPCG, consider a better response of task Ti. Since all of Ti’s node utilizations are
the same, and since one cannot collocate any pair of these nodes on the same hosting node, the better
response of Ti can be realized by a sequence of moves involving only one node. Therefore, we can
apply the same potential function as in Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 to show that the better response
dynamics converges. Examples (b) and (c) in Figure 2 illustrate the case in which non-uniform PPCG
cycles.
4 PCG: Local Better-Response Algorithms
When a player (process) is about to make a move, the best response (BR) for that player requires it to
identify all possible resources to which its process could be mapped, and for each such resource solve
a knapsack problem involving the player’s own process and the processes of all the players currently
using that resource. The player’s BR would be to move its process to the resource that yields the
minimal cost. Obviously, doing so is not practical as the knapsack problem itself is NP-hard, and
examining all possible resources may not be realistic.
Instead we propose a local better response that is easily implemented in a distributed manner.
Using our local better response heuristic, the player queries a resource (e.g., EC-2 node) at random
to identify the set of processes currently mapped to that resource. Next, the player uses a (heuristic)
solution of the above-mentioned knapsack problem. If a cost-reducing solution is found, the player
requests to move its process to that resource, otherwise the player has to wait until its next turn to
try again.5
The knapsack problem itself is NP-complete, but there is a dynamic programming algorithm for
solving it in pseudo-polynomial time for reasonable size instances. Given that in practice the number
of processes assigned to a resource is unlikely to exceed a few hundreds, the Dynamic Programming
solution of the Knapsack Problem (DPKP) would be tractable. In addition to DPKP, we also
considered branch & bound heuristics using either breadth-first search (BFS) or depth-first search
(DFS). Branch & Bound BFS and DFS limit the degree and the depth of the search to limit the
amount of time spent by a player to find a better response. In the remainder of this section, we
discuss the use of DPKP, BFS, and DFS as the local better-response strategy.
4.1 Dynamic Programming Solution of the Knapsack Problem (DPKP)
With reference to eq. (8), notice that the problem of minimizing the cost incurred by a task for
packing its process in a resource reduces to the problem of maxizing U ′b, or equivalently minimizing
the slack (unused capacity) of a resource. For this analysis let us define a workload as a set of tasks
(processes) W = {Tk, . . .}, and the slack as s(W ) = R −
∑
Ti∈W
Ti, where R is the capacity vector
of the resource. The quantity we want to minimize is the volume of the slack v(W ) =
∏
s(W ).
For the construction of the dynamic programming solution, we will assume demands and capacities
are discrete b-bits quantities, in a d-dimensional space. This implies that there are 2b values per
dimension, yielding a total of 2bd discrete volumes.
The key observation in defining DPKP is that the best solution that includes task Ti is the
union of {Ti} and the best solution for the resource of capacity R − Ti. If we proceed considering
one additional task at a time, it may be the case that either the best solution for some capacity R is
the same as when we considered only tasks T1, . . . , Ti−1, or the alternative solution for R− Ti union
{Ti}. Therefore we can compute the overhead of the optimal solution using the recurrence:
A(i, j) = min
{
A(i− 1, j), v(W(i−1,k) ∪ Ti)
}
(13)
where the column indexes (j, k) are over an enumeration of the capacity vectors whose increments
are the discrete capacity steps, so in (13), k is the index of the column corresponding to the capacity
5 To reduce the total number of moves, we note that players may adopt a cost threshold heuristic, whereby a player
will only adopt a move if the resulting cost improvement is at least p% of the player’s current cost (or is at least some
fixed absolute threshold).
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function searchBetterMove(Set of tasks T)
A(0,:) = Infinity
tasksPerColumn(0,:) = {empty}
maxColumn = 2^(b*d) // Bits times Dimensions
foreach i in T
for j=0 to maxColumn
residualVolume = volume(j)-volume(i)
if residualVolume>0
k = columnOf(residualVolume)
cost = volumen( tasksPerColumn(0,k) Union i )
if cost<A(0,j)
tasksPerColumn(1,k) = tasksPerColumn(0,k) Union i
A(1,j) = cost
endif
endif
endfor
A(0,:) = A(1,:)
tasksPerColumn(0,:) = tasksPerColumn(1,:)
endfor
endfunction
Figure 6: Pseudocode for the DPKP Better Response Algorithm
of column j minus task Ti:
k = column(Rj − Ti)
As a boundary condition, for cases where Rj − Ti ≤ 0 on any of its dimensions, the cost is ∞, same
for A(0, j). Observe that the rows need not be ordered. All what is needed when computing row i is
to have all the values of row i− 1. Therefore the space requirement is limited to keeping in memory
the current and the previous set of rows. If there are d dimensions and b bits per dimension, the total
space required is O(2bd). As for the time, the algorithm finishes when it reaches the last column of
the last row, therefore if m is the number of tasks, the time is O(m2bd). This solution suffers from
the curse of dimensionality for large values of d or for high granularities.
Figure 6 gives the pseudocode of DKPD.
4.2 Branch and Bound Better Response Heuristics
Figure 7 shows the branch-and-bound better-response algorithm. It takes two parameters degree
and maxDepth that limit the portion of the search space explored. If the task (process) fits in the
given resource, the algorithm returns immediately. Otherwise, the algorithm searches for the minimal
set of tasks that need to be replaced in order for the new task to fit. In this pseudocode, list is a
data structure that may be implemented as a FIFO queue to give a BFS search, or as a LIFO queue
to give a DFS search. The algorithm keeps track of the best solution found so far, and when it is
done (either because it was able to explore the full search space or because it reached the bounds
established by degree and maxDepth) it returns its current best solution.
4.3 Local Better-Response Procedure
Having presented the DPKP and Branch & Bound BFS/DFS solutions to the knapsack problem,
we are now ready to present the procedure to be followed by each player to find its better-response
move. Let k denote the player (task) whose turn it is to make a better-response move. Let P0 and
U0 be the price and utilization of the resource to which player k is currently assigned.
1. Player k randomly picks a resource j of capacity Rj and price Pj . Let Vj denote the set of tasks
currently assigned to resource j.
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function initialize(Task T, Resource R)
need = R.utilization()-(R.capacity()-T.volume())
list = {}
tasksToReplace = {}
if need<0
return tasksToReplace // Move found no task needs to be replaced
for i=1 to degree
chosen = random not chosen task from R.tasks()
node.parent = null
node.task = chosen
node.sumVolume = chosen.volume
node.depth = 1
list.add(node)
endfor
bestSolution = search(list, T, R)
if (bestSolution != null)
tasksToReplace = set of tasks in the chain from
bestSolution to the root
return tasksToReplace
else
return "no better move found"
endif
endfunction
function search(list, T, R)
bestCost = infinity
bestSolution = null
while( ! list.isEmpty() )
node = list.remove()
newVolume = R.sumVolume() - node.sumVolume + T.volume()
newCost = R.price()*T.volume()/newVolume
if (newVolume>R.sumVolume() and newCost<T.cost()
and newCost<bestCost)
bestCost = newCost
bestSolution = node
else
if (node.depth<maxDepth)
for i=1 to degree
chosen = random not chosen task
from R.tasks()
child.parent = node
child.task = chosen
child.sumVolume = node.sumVolume
+ chosen.volume
child.depth = node.depth+1
list.add(child)
endfor
endif
endif
endwhile
return bestSolution
endfunction
Figure 7: Pseudocode for the Branch-and-Bound Better-Response Heuristics
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2. Let S ⊆ Vj be the solution of the knapsack problem (obtained using any one of the approaches
we presented above), where the knapsack capacity is Rj −Xk and the set of tasks is Vj . Let vi
be the volume of task i. A valid move exists if∑
i∈S∪{k}
Xi ≤ Rj
∑
i∈S∪{k}
vi >
∑
i∈Vj
vi
Pj∑
i∈S∪{k} vi
<
P0
U0
The first condition for a valid move is the feasibility condition, which is implicit in any knapsack
solution. The second condition underscores the total utilization increase, assuring that the cost
of the tasks that will remain assigned to resource j will decrease. The third condition is the cost
reduction for player k.
3. If player k is able to identify a valid move, then it replaces the set of tasks Vj \S on resource j.6
5 PCG: Experimental Evaluation
To explore the potential from using collocation games as the underlying mechanism for enabling ra-
tional, selfish users to make cost-effective use of a distributed (cloud) infrastructure available through
an independent provider who has no economic incentive to do so, we conducted a series of experiments
for variants of the process collocation game, which are natural candidates for resource management
in cloud computing environments. In this section, we summarize results from these experiments.
Data Sets and PCG Variants: In our experiments, we used synthetically-generated as well as
trace-driven (PlanetLab) workloads, which we applied to unidimensional and multidimensional vari-
ants of PCG under both a homogeneous and heterogeneous resource model.
Our synthetic workloads give us the flexibility of varying the number of resources, number of
tasks, and dimensionality. More importantly, it enables us to experiment with workloads for which
we know (by construction) that a socially-optimal solution exists. We do so by repeatedly fragmenting
the full capacities of a set of resources and then using the resulting fragments as a representation
of the utilization (demand) of a set of tasks. By construction, we know that a “perfect” collocation
exists (with every resource being fully utilized). Next, we place the resulting tasks in a much larger
set of resources, which constitute our initial configuration. We have generated and experimented
with a number of datasets for different versions of PCG. Here we present results for unidimensional
and 3-dimensional PCG workloads when resources are homogeneous (of uniform capacities) as well
as heterogeneous.
Our trace-driven workloads were constructed using publicly available PlanetLab traces of CoMon
[22, 11]. PlanetLab is an example of a hosting infrastructure (much like the ones we entertain in this
paper) which allows applied networking researchers to submit tasks of various resource utilization
needs (demand) for hosting on PlanetLab servers. The traces we used give us snapshots of PlanetLab
server capacities as well as the utilization of the slices assigned to the various tasks collocated on each
server. The main advantage of this dataset is that it gives us a realistic distribution of typical task
utilizations on a fairly large scale. Its disadvantage is that one cannot compare the configurations
resulting from the collocation game to socially-optimal configurations – the latter being infeasible to
compute due to PlanetLab’s scale. Thus for these workloads, we report the worst/best cost ratios for
a series of runs of the same game instance. In PlanetLab, server capacities as well as slice utilizations
(corresponding to the utilizations of a slice’s CPU, memory, uplink, and downlink). This makes
PlanetLab an example of an infrastructure on top of which a multidimensional PCG game may be
6 As a result of a replacement move, the set of replaced tasks (Vj \ S) are assigned to a new (empty) resource. This
will necessarily increase their costs, possibly triggering these tasks to execute their own better-response moves.
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Figure 8: Median (top) and worst-case (bottom) collocation ratio for synthetic workloads.
implemented. As with synthetic workloads, our PlanetLab experiments considered both homogeneous
and heterogeneous resource models.
Player Response: As computation of a player’s best response is an NP-complete problem, in our
implementation, we settled on and implemented three better response strategies: (1) A dynamic-
programming knapsack solution (DPKP), (2) A depth-first search (DFS) with branch-and-bound
pruning, and (3) a breadth-first search (BFS) also with branch-and-bound pruning (see §4 for more
details).
Metrics: To characterize the PCG game dynamics, we evaluated a number of metrics, namely: (1)
the collocation ratio which we define to be the ratio of average/optimal social cost (for synthetic
workloads) and of worst/best social cost (for trace-driven workloads); (2) the total number of move
trials until an equilibrium is reached; and (3) the total number of actual moves until an equilibrium
is reached. The collocation ratio characterizes the (in)efficiency of the collocation resulting from
playing the game, and is bounded by the price of anarchy (PoA), which we derived analytically for
unidimensional PCG. The number of trials gives us insight as to the total time it takes for the game
to reach an equilibrium. The number of moves gives us insight in the overhead involved in relocating
players (tasks) since each relocation involves migration costs, etc.
To compute all three metrics, we need to establish whether an equilibrium has been reached.
As shown earlier in the paper, verifying that the game is at a NE is an NP-hard problem. Thus,
the criterion we used to declare that an equilibrium has been reached was to set a threshold on the
number of consecutive trials attempted without resulting in a move. The thresholds we used were
such that doubling them (e.g., from 500 to 1,000) did not change our metrics much.
Collocation Efficiency for Synthetic Workloads: Figure 8 shows the median (over 100 samples)
of the collocation ratios for synthetically-generated workloads in both homogeneous and heteroge-
neous settings. Recall that in a homogeneous (heterogeneous) setting all resources are (not) of equal
capacities. These results show that the PoA bound (of 3/2 for homogeneous cases and 2 for hetero-
geneous cases) for the collocation ratio holds for the median (1D). In the worst-case, there were a
few samples above the bound, which we attribute to the approximate better-response computation
and the threshold for detecting an equilibrium.
The results in Figure 8 show that the collocation ratio tends to decrease (i.e., better efficiency)
as the number of players increases, which bodes well for large-scale deployments. Also, our results
show that collocation efficiency was basically independent of the better-response heuristic in use.
Here we note that the branch-and-bound BFS and DFS heuristics we used were much faster than
the dynamic programming (DPKP) heuristic. Indeed, DPKP was not able to handle many of our 3D
and PlanetLab instances of PCG (hence the omitted results in Figure 8 for 3D cases).
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Figure 9: Median and worst-case collocation ratio for PlanetLab workloads.
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
1D 3D 1D 3D
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
m
ov
es
BFS
DFS
DP KP
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
BFS
DFS
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
BFS
DFS
DP KP
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
BFS
DFS
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
m
ov
es
Game size (processes)
BFS
DFS
DP KP
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 1800
 2000
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
Game size (processes)
BFS
DFS
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1000
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
Game size (processes)
BFS
DFS
DP KP
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90 100
Game size (processes)
BFS
DFS
Figure 10: Median (top) and worst-case (bottom) number of moves for synthetic workloads.
Comparing our results for homogeneous versus heterogeneous settings, we note that the median
collocation ratio in the latter setting was only slightly larger.
Collocation Ratio for PlanetLab Workloads: Figure 9 shows the median collocation ratio
(ratio of worst/best social cost) using the task specifications derived from the PlanetLab traces.
These results imply a relatively small collocation ratio, which as with synthetic workloads seems to
be independent of the better response heuristic used. As shown in Figure 9, the worst-case collocation
ratios were not too far off.7
Convergence Speed and Overhead: Figures 10 and 11 show the number of moves it takes to reach
equilibrium. They indicate that the number of moves is directly related to the number of tasks in the
system and fairly independent by the heuristic used to compute the better response. The relation is
essentially linear for unidimensional PCG and follows a power law for higher dimensionality PCGs.
Figures 12 and 13 show the number of trials to reach equilibrium. Similar to the number of
moves, the number of trials follows a power law dependent on the dimensionality of the problem,
almost linear for 1D settings.
We also experimented with various heuristics for determining the player who attempts the next
move. These are 1) random, chooses the player who is going to make the trials uniformly at random,
2) round-robin, all players go around taking turns, and 3) worst-collocated first, players who are
currently paying higher overhead costs get more chances to move. To evaluate the effect of the
selection heuristic on the convergence of the game, Figure 14 shows the number of moves and trials
under the various strategies. In general the effect is minimal suggesting that the convergence speed
is independent of the selection policy.
7 Here we note that the abundance of small tasks in the trace significantly improve the chances of achieving better
placements.
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Figure 11: Number of moves for PlanetLab workloads.
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Figure 12: Median (top) and worst-case (bottom) number of trials for synthetic workloads.
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Figure 13: Number of trials for PlanetLab workloads.
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Figure 14: Comparing player selection strategies – Median number of Moves – Synthetic dataset
6 Conclusion
Collocation Games offer a natural paradigm for modeling and analyzing the dynamics that are likely
to result when rational, selfish parties (users) interact in an attempt to minimize the individual
costs they incur to secure the shared infrastructure resources necessary to support the QoS or SLA
requirements of their applications. Collocation games offer an attractive alternative to approaches
that require such parties to trust infrastructure providers (who have no vested interest in minimizing
user costs, and may indeed have the exact opposite incentive) or those that expect such parties to be
altruistic or to accept best-effort (as opposed to reservation-based) approaches that do not guarantee
performance isolation.
In this paper we introduced the general collocation game (GCG) as well as the process collo-
cation game (PCG), a more restricted version of GCG, along with variants of PCG that allow for
unidimensional or multidimensional resources, homogeneous or heterogeneous resource capacities,
and scalar or parallel resource configurations. We presented analytical results related to the exis-
tence and complexity of Nash equilibria for a number of these games. Also, using both synthetic
and trace-driven workloads, we presented results from extensive empirical performance evaluation of
practical and scalable implementations of the strategies underlying these games.
Collocation games are not only valuable as modeling and analysis tools, but also they provide a
solid framework upon which purely distributed resource acquisition and management protocols may
be conceived for emerging cloud computing, grid, and peer-to-peer overlays. In this paper we have
shown that although best response computation may be expensive, computationally-efficient better-
response heuristics are quite promising. We are currently exploring protocol designs that will enable
peers (e.g., in a P2P system) to use collocation games to efficiently self-organize and to rationally and
selfishly optimize their individual resource acquisition costs without reliance on any central authority.
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